Tax Aspects of Fiscal Federalism

This book examines the extreme complexity and the evolution of taxing authority towards a progressive increase in the local governments’ taxing powers.

Why this book?

Tax Aspects of Fiscal Federalism: A Comparative Analysis provides a comprehensive survey of the distribution of the taxing authority among different levels of governments of a selection of countries. The survey is not restricted to the traditional federal countries, such as the United States and Switzerland, but also includes traditional unitary states (or forms of government), such as France and the United Kingdom. The detailed approach demonstrates the current historical trend towards a progressive increase in the local governments’ (taxing) authority. In this way, the reaction to the crisis of the (tax) state, and the search for the highest level of public efficiency, pass through the devolution of the taxing powers.

This book aims to explain not only how the Constitution (or the Supreme Law) allocates taxing powers but, in particular, how these systems work in practice. Each country chapter discusses the constitutional structure of the state (or of the government) and looks at how it has been implemented as well as at the effects of this design on the form of the state (or government) and the tax system.

The structure of the book is simple and consistent. It begins with a methodological analysis for the comparison of different constitutional tax systems. This is followed by a description of the “fiscal federalism” systems of selected countries, beginning, for historical reasons, with the United States and concluding with a developing system, the People’s Republic of China. The remaining country chapters are grouped according to either historical or geographical criteria. Also included is a chapter devoted to the European Union, a federal system in arms, in order to highlight its peculiarities and define the limits for the Member States’ sovereignty.